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Abstract 
The Southern Philippines is known as one of the areas that never gets out of conflict. 
Even so, in 2017, the public was shocked by the emergence of the Maute group in 
Marawi which is affiliated with ISIS, also known as Daesh, who are transnational 
terrorists. They commit many human rights violations such as kidnapping and murder. In 
addition, terrorist groups that have existed before, like Abu Sayyaf, often operated by 
crossing several Southeast Asian countries’ water boundaries, so the problem is 
transformed into a regional issue. This study aims to describe and analyze the relationship 
between transnational Islamic movements, which are the cause of regional terrorism, and 
the opposition formed by an alternative military approach in combination with religion. 
These approaches were formed after conventional military actions were felt to be too 
difficult. This research’s results show that, to face the difficulties of conventional military 
approaches, the Philippines government formed a Muslim special unit in their military 
force. On the one hand, this change could have positive impacts. Religious and cultural 
approach, compared to a conventional military approach, can open up a larger dialogue 
space. Therefore this unit can be more adaptable because it has the ability to gain local 
community support. Finally, this specialized unit can facilitate military coordination and 
cooperation with Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei Darussalam as they are allcountries 
with a majority Muslim population. But, on the other hand, this specialized unit can also 
have negative impacts. For example, there is the potential emergence of factions within 
the military or gap between the Muslim units with other soldiers. Also, this unit can 
reinforce the stigma that Muslims are terrorists and must be fought with hard-core 
Muslims that are in military uniform. 
 
Keywords: Transnational Islam, Regional Terrorism, Muslim Special Unit, the 
Philippines Military 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays, various forms of terrorist attacks are increasingly dangerous, and they 
spread throughout the world. These attacks are not only in the Middle East, but 
they also extend to Southeast Asia which is now facing frontal attacks. In historical 
context, the threat of extremism and radicalism that led to the acts of terror began 
to receive a big response from ASEAN after the September 11, 2001 tragedy on 
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the World Trade Center in the United States and the Bali Blast on October 12, 
2002 in Indonesia.1 The topic of terrorism is both complex and emotive. The 
topic is complex because it combines many different aspects of the human 
experience, including subjects such as politics, psychology, philosophy, military 
strategy, and history.2 In Southeast Asia, the fundamental problem of terrorism 
cannot be separated from the majority-minority relationships and heterogeneity. 
Not much different from the conditions of minority groups in other parts of the 
world, the part of the southern Philippines that is the basis for Muslim society is 
also a conflict-prone area in regard to religious and ethnicity backgrounds. Muslim 
minorities in the Philippines are popularly referred to as Moros. The term has a 
pejorative connotation and symbolizes the general disease of the Muslim position 
in relation to the majority people.3 The bad connotation makes Muslims in the 
Philippines feel discriminated socially and culturally. 
In the Philippines, Muslims initially prefered peaceful ways to gain 
sovereignty or freedom in organizing their lives. However, they began to think 
that the constitutional struggle for independence could not be done peacefully 
under the conditions of the period. This is because,  humans have two potentials 
in their self, namely love for their identity group and aggression, as proposed by 
Ibn Khaldun in Muqaddimah.4 Therefore, led by Nur Misuari, Muslim group in 
the Southern Philippines formed the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) to 
organize their struggle through an armed way. But then this intention changed 
when the Philippine government started negotiations with MNLF in 1975. MNLF 
began to soften, willing to negotiate and compromise, until finally one year later 
they reached an agreement on the framework of conflict resolution in the 
Southern Philippines. 
This agreement is known as the Tripoli Agreement. It was signed on 23 
December 1976 in Tripoli, the capital city of Libya, between MNLF and the 
Philippine government. The main point of the Tripoli Agreement was for the 
MNLF to receive autonomous status in the southern Philippines regions covering 
thirteen provinces: Sulu, Basilan, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga del 
Norte, North Cotabato, Manguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, Lanao Norte, Lanao Sur, 
Davao Sur, South Cotabato, and Palawan.5 Under the agreement full autonomy in 
the field of courts and education was given, while the field of defense and foreign 
                                                         
1  Ralf Emmers, “ASEAN and the Securitization of Transnational Crime in Southeast Asia”, The 
Pacific Review Vol. 16 No. 3, (2003). 
2   United States Institute of Peace, “Teaching Guide on International Terrorism: Definitions, 
Causes, and Responses”, Education Program Vol. 202, (2001), p. 3.  
3  Peter G. Gowing, “Moros and Khaek: The Position of Muslim Minorities in the Philippines and 
Thailand”, in Reading on Islam in Southeast Asia, ed. Ahmad Ibrahim et al. (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies - ISEAS, 1985), p. 184. 
4  Hakimul Ikhwan Affandi, Akar Konflik Sepanjang Zaman: Elaborasi Pemikiran Ibn Khaldun, 
(Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2004), p. 84. 
5  Christine Bell and Vanessa Utley, “Chronology of Mindanao Peace Agreements”, The Political 
Settlements Research Programme Briefing Paper Vol. 2, (2015), p. 1. 
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policy remained under the authority of the central government in Manila, the 
capital city of the Phillipenes. On the other hand, the Tripoli Agreement sparked 
a split within the MNLF. There was a faction that accepted the terms of the 
Tripoli Agreement and a faction that rejected the agreement. Those who rejected 
the Tripoli Agreement broke away and formed a new group called the Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), while the more extreme factions later formed the 
Abu Sayyaf group. It should be noted that the MILF and Abu Sayyaf are 
currently two hostile groups due to differences in understanding, approach, and 
methods. 
After the Tripoli Agreement was signed, the social life of the communities in 
the thirteen provinces of the predominantly Muslim, southern Philippines 
improved. But these peaceful conditions did not last long because the 
continuation of the peace agreement signed in Tripoli was finally betrayed by 
President Ferdinand Marcos himself by holding a referendum in the thirteen 
provinces contained in the Tripoli Agreement. The argument used by Marcos was 
to find out whether the population of the thirteen provinces was to be granted the 
special autonomy in the agreement or not. But, the intention of Marcos's 
referendum was nothing more than a trick to break the Tripoli Agreement 
smoothly. Because, before the referendum was done, Manila first moved a 
massive amount of people in the largely Catholic majority of the North 
Philippines.  
Due to this migration, the southern region, which used to be comprised of a 
Muslim majority became predominantly Catholic. This condition was intentionally 
done in order to ensure that the results of the referendum would be what was 
expected by Marcos: that the majority of the people would reject the special 
autonomy because the newly moved population also directly had the right to 
vote. 6  As a result, the Muslim community fought against the result of the 
referendum which they believe to be full of fraud, so that religious social conflicts 
raged again, which still lasts today. To make matters worse, the Muslim 
community was labeled a terrorist group. Runningthe resistance certainly needed 
a lot of money. These conditions forced the militias to look for alternatives in 
finding funds. For the Abu Sayyaf group, one of the avenues they often chose was 
the abduction of foreign people to demand large compensation. This 
compensation would come from private companies or  the government of the 
abductees’ country of origin. 
Since the end of 2015, the news regarding piracy and kidnapping in the 
Indonesian-Philippine border waters was endless. Kidnapping happened again 
shortly after a meeting which resulted in the Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) between the armed forces chiefs of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the 
                                                         
6  Bayu Mitra A. Kusuma, “Islam, Asymmetric Policy, and Social Conflicts: The State’s Role as a 
Root of Radicalism in the Philippines and Thailand”, IKAT: The Indonesian Journal of 
Southeast Asian Studies Vol. 1 No. 1, (2017). 
474 
Transnational Islam, Regional Terrorism, and Military Power: The Rise of Muslim 
Special Unit in the Philippines Armed Force 
 
Philippines in the middle of 2016. It should be noted that the commander of the 
three armed forces signed an agreement on May 5, 2016 that contains four points. 
First, the three countries agreed to jointly patrol the border waters. Secondly, they 
agreed to provide assistance as soon as possible if there are people or boats in 
trouble and in need of help. Third, the agreement established a national focal 
point among the three countries to facilitate the sharing of information and 
intelligence in a short time.  Finally, hotline communication was created between 
the three countries to accelerate response time in the case of emergency situations. 
The high intensity of abductions seems to illustrate that as de facto the water 
area has been controlled by militias or armed groups, in this case, the Abu Sayyaf 
group. Abu Sayyaf is not an amateur militia. They are highly trained, modernly 
armed, and a loyal follower of Abu Bakar Al-Baghdadi, the supreme leader of the 
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), or Daesh, who was recently reported to 
have been killed. It should always be emphasized that global and regional outlook 
is bleaker. Consider the challenge of the international network of terrorism. 
Experience indicates that terrorist groups thrive on collaboration across national 
boundaries.7 Kidnapping is aimed at large compensation from the hostage’s state 
government. This money is strongly suspected to be used as a financing source for 
terrorist activities which, according to their distorted perspective, is ‘jihad.’8 In 
2015 alone, the number of Filipinos recruited by ISIS is around 200 people.9 If 
this recruitment continues to be left, then ISIS recruitment will become greater. 
ISIS has made the southern Philippines their base in Southeast Asia and 
appointed Isnilon Hapilon, also known as Abu Abdullah al-Filipini, as the ISIS 
leader for Southeast Asia.10 
In addition to the two free deliveries without compensation of Indonesian 
citizens in 2016, generally the victim release by Abu Sayyaf militia ends with a 
compensation payment. For example, an Italian citizen was released after being 
redeemed for millions of pesos. This is in contrast to the tragic fate of the 
Canadian hostages who were executed after the requested compensation for the 
militia was not paid by the deadline that was determined. If there is a conversation 
concerning risk management, all the mechanisms of hostage release must be 
considered a risk. The military option is actually very dangerous considering the 
Abu Sayyaf militia is controls the terrain, understands secret shortcuts in the forest 
for guerrilla, and is supported by some surrounding communities. Therefore, the 
military operation has the potential to give birth to an asymmetrical war that will 
                                                         
7  Yonah Alexander, “Contemporary Terrorism: From National to Regional and Global Threats”, 
Defence Against Terrorism Review Vol. 1 No. 2, (2008), p. 42. 
8  Bayu Mitra A. Kusuma, Abu Sayyaf Piracy: An ASEAN Political Security Challenge, online: 
http://isais.or.id/en/abu-sayyaf-piracy-an-asean-political-security-challenge, (July 4, 2017). 
9  Ahmed S. Hashim, The Impact of the Islamic State in Asia: Policy Report, (Singapore: S. 
Rajaratnam School of International Studies - RSIS NTU, 2015). 
10  Sidney Jones, “Pro-ISIS Groups in Mindanao and Their Links to Indonesia and Malaysia”, 
Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) Report Vol. 33, (2016). 
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greatly benefit the militia. The fact that these kidnapping cases affect foreign 
nationals, the kidnapping locations are within the border areas of the country, and 
that complex handling must be done by several countries, all make Abu Sayyaf 
kidnapping a regional terrorism issue.  
Furthermore, this in-depth study will sequentially explain the relationship 
between the threat of the transnational Islamic movement, which is the cause of 
the emergence of regional terrorism, and the opposing military power. But, 
because conventional military power has not produced results, the Philippine 
government tried an alternative approach by combining military and religion in 
the formation of the special Muslim units within their military bodies. 
II. STATE BORDER AREAS AND REGIONAL TERRORISM 
Borders are the outermost frontier and often the most remote areas. Because of 
their remote positions, the border areas often receive less attention from the 
government. But, on the other hand, borders are also regions that often lead to 
conflict between countries. For the example, the South China Sea case is very 
attention-grabbing. It is common knowledge that the People’s Republic of China 
claims most of the South China Sea with their “nine dash line;” consequently, 
there is an overlap of claims with some other countries. They claimed the nine 
dash line as their traditional fishing area that has been going on for thousands of 
years.11 This claim is groundless given that the terminology is not recognized in 
the international law of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea or 
UNCLOS 1982.12 The conflict of water border claims occur between China and 
many other countries, including Vietnam, Japan, Malaysia, and the Philippines. In 
this claim, the Philippines calls the South China Sea, the Western Philippine Sea.13  
This conflict, which results from mutual claims, is so intricate and makes the 
constellation of relationships between countries unstable. This conflict is becoming 
an increasingly contentious source of geopolitical tension. 14  It is because, 
originally, borders were used to delimit the territorial possessions of sovereign 
states, and the work of social scientists served the purpose of rulers who were 
                                                         
11  Agus Rustandi, The Impact of China’s ‘Nine-Dash Line’ Claim on ASEAN’s Role in the Indo-
Pacific Region, (Canberra: The Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies (CDSS) Australian 
Defence College, 2015), p. 3. 
12  Bayu Mitra A. Kusuma, “Mengelola Perbatasan dengan Border Governance”, Jawa Pos Radar 
Banyuwangi, (Saturday, April 16, 2016), p. 38. 
13  Aileen Baviera and Jay Batongbacal, The West Philippine Sea: The Territorial and Maritime 
Jurisdiction Disputes from a Filipino Perspective, (Manila: The Asian Center and Institute for 
Maritime Affairs and Law of the Sea University of the Philippines, 2013), p. 1. 
14  Bert Chapman, “China's Nine-Dashed Map: Continuing Maritime Source of Geopolitical 
Tension”, Geopolitics, History, and International Relations Vol. 8 No. 1, (2016), p. 146. 
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eager to picture the boundary line demarcating their possessions. 15  Another 
opinion states that national interests regarding the borders of countries are 
enormous because the border region affects the security, integrity, and sovereignty 
of a state.16 Such definitions are commonly used because most current political, 
geographical papers wish to understand the relationships between territory, 
sovereignty, and identity.17  
In the internal conflicts of Southeast Asian nations themselves, it is undeniable 
that in the border areas between Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines there 
are various water security challenges that must be faced by the three countries' 
authorities. Therefore, the threat of maritime piracy, hostage-taking, and 
transnational crime must be resolved as soon as possible. If this unsafe situation is 
not addressed quickly, it will impact the decline in the level of international 
confidence in the Southeast Asia region in general. This will impact trade, 
commerce, investment, and tourism. It must be admitted that not many are aware 
of the importance of the Sulu Sea and Sulawesi as strategic global economic 
waterways.  
With the demise of the Cold War, new concepts of security that addressed 
not only the military realities of the contemporary world but also the political, 
economic, and social realities were developed.18 This is similiar with the piracy 
that occurred on the water border of Indonesia and the Philippines. The 
kidnapping is not only related to the Abu Sayyaf efforts to show their existence 
politically, but it is also strongly related to the economic gap and the vulnerability 
of social conditions of Muslim society in the southern Philippines. The threat of 
piracy is subsequently transformed into regional terrorism. Terrorism is defined as 
the recurrent or threatened use of politically motivated and clandestinely 
organized violence by a group whose aim is to influence a psychological target in 
order to make it behave in a way which the group desires. Terrorism constitutes 
the illegitimate use of force to achieve a political objective when innocent people 
are targeted.19 In the sense of regional terrorism, terrorism activities are carried 
out across borders in one region, such as the activity of Abu Sayyaf piracy in 
Southeast Asian countries water border. 
Piracy that occurred in these territorial waters has already happened long 
enough. Beginning in March 2005, the Bonggaya 91 vessel was hijacked by the 
                                                         
15  Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly, “The State of Borders and Borderlands Studies 2009: A Historical 
View and a View from the Journal of Borderlands Studies”, Eurasia Border Review Vol. 1 No. 
1, (2009), p. 3. 
16  Yohannes Sanak, Human Security dan Politik Perbatasan, (Yogyakarta: PolGov UGM, 2014), 
p. 15. 
17  Henk van Houtum, “The Geopolitics of Borders and Boundaries”, Geopolitics Vol. 10, (2005), 
p. 673. 
18  Craig A. Snyder, Contemporary Security and Strategy, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 
p. 1. 
19  Walter Laqueur, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
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Abu Sayyaf group. Three crew members were taken hostage. Two hostages were 
freed by the Philippine military, but one was successfully taken into the forest by 
kidnappers. The hostage was only released six months later. The question arises 
of how the Abu Sayyaf group seemed so understanding of the movement of ships 
in the area. It seems that the destination point of the Abu Sayyaf group is always 
precise. There are allegations that the Abu Sayyaf has spread spies in various 
strategic positions.20 The alleged Abu Sayyaf spy was first made by Indonesian 
Armed Force (TNI) Commander at the end of 2016. The year in which the 
numbers of Indonesian flagged ships hiked sharply. There is the possibility that 
the Abu Sayyaf group commits piracy crimes easily because it gets information 
about the sailing of the ships from their espionage in Indonesia. Intelligence 
circles in Indonesia sniff out spys from the Abu Sayyaf network by placing 
military spy at strategic ports of Kalimantan Island. 
When in the territorial waters of Indonesia or Malaysia, ships can still pass 
freely. However once entering Philippine waters, the existence of these ships 
becomes unsafe and piracy can happen anytime. The big question now is, why 
does piracy in the region seem so free. This puts the existence of the Philippine 
military into question. Does the Abu Sayyaf have an understading of the Patrol 
military patterns of the Philippines? Is the intensity of patrols by the Philippine 
military in their border waters so loose? Or, is the strength and fleet of the 
Philippine military not sufficient enough to maintain their entire territory, 
particularly border water territory? Therefore, before we discuss the emergence of 
Muslim special units in more detail, it is important to understand the posture of 
the Philippines military first. 
III. THE PHILIPPINES MILITARY: IDEAL PLAN VS CURRENT 
REALITY 
The military power development in Southeast Asian countries continues to show 
an increasing trend in the post-Cold War period. All countries in the region have 
engaged in forced modernization programs to varying degrees, although this does 
not equate with military effectiveness. While the Revolution in Military Affairs 
(RMA) has had varying effects on the region’s military capabilities, it is important 
to note that much more than the mere acquisition of modern weapons systems is 
required for a true RMA to take place.21 
Comprehensive military strength is not only based on how sophisticated the 
weaponry is but includes all aspects of the state apparatus and resources contained 
in a country that can be functioned immediately for war purposes. These include 
                                                         
20  Irwan Nugroho, Investigasi: Menelusuri Mata-Mata Abu Sayyaf, online: 
https://x.detik.com/detail/investigasi/20161013/Menelusuri-Mata- mata-Abu-Sayyaf/index.php, 
(July 13, 2017). 
21  Andrew Tan, Force Modernisation Trends in Southeast Asia, (Singapore: Institute of Defence 
and Strategic Studies - IDSS NTU, 2004), p. 1. 
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the number of personnel, the major weapons systems, the power of maritime, 
logistics, natural resources, geographic strength, finance, and the supporting 
infrastructure. These eight aspects are subsequently broken down into eight, key 
powers that directly affect the decisions of war: the strength of the personnel, the 
air force, the army, the marines, logistics, natural resources, finances, and 
geographic strength.22 From the perspective of these eight aspects, the question 
can be asked, how is the Philippine military power in general? 
The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) or in Tagalog language, 
Sandatahang Lakas ng Pilipinas, is the official name of the Philippine military. 
AFP consists of the army, the navy, and the air force. Based on data from the 
Global Fire Power - a trusted site in military studies - in 2017, the Philippines 
military is ranked 50th in the world from 133 countries. While in the Southeast 
Asia region, the position of Philippines military is under Indonesia (ranked 14), 
Vietnam (ranked 16), Thailand (ranked 20), and Malaysia (ranked 33). But the 
Philippines position is still above Singapore (ranked 65) which, in fact, has the 
most sophisticated weapons in Southeast Asia. However, if viewed from the 
sophistication of the main armaments system and the capabilities of its personnel, 
the Philippine military has lagged far behind the countries mentioned above. Even 
the Philippines is still ranked below Myanmar. So, the international community is 
not surprised when the Philippines finds it very difficult to overcome separatism 
and terrorism in their territories. 
The Philippines military has been the target of criticism and pessimism by 
military observers. Especially the air force, as it is very limited in the number of 
fighter and navy aircrafts. The air force is also limited in the number of combat 
ships. Like most Southeast Asian countries, naval and air force development in 
the Philippine military is also under the shadow of the army.23 But, the condition 
is now gradually beginning to overcome this in balance with the arrival of 
advanced training aircraft semi fighters which were purchased from South Korea. 
Although it is not a real fighter aircraft, the purchase is certainly better than the 
previous conditions and was greeted with joy by air force personnel. As for 
maritime reinforcement, two frigates ex United States Coast Guard and two 
Strategic Sealift Vessel type ship from PT PAL Indonesia were bought and are 
claimed as the most advanced ship they have today. But, what happened after the 
reinforcement was not as expected and has not been able to change the 
international stigma of their military? 
The Philippine military weakness can be seen from their action in the battle 
against terrorists on the Mindanao Island. Currently, fierce fighting is still taking 
                                                         
22  Global Fire Power, 2017 Philippines Military Strength: Current Military Capabilities and 
Available Firepower for the Nation of the Philippines, online: 
http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=philippines, 
(July 17, 2017). 
23  Gregory Vincent Raymond, “Naval Modernization in Southeast Asia: Under the Shadow of 
Army Dominance?”, Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 39 No. 1, (2017). 
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place between the Maute terrorist group and the Philippine army in the town of 
Marawi. A total of 180,000 residents, or about 90 percent of Marawi's total 
population, has left the city. Geographically, this city is located in the lush tropical 
hills, but, in recent months, it has turned into an urban battlefield. Phillipene 
President Duterte declared a state of martial law in Mindanao as troops outside 
Marawi approached the Isnilon Hapilon territory that had proclaimed himself as 
Southeast Asian "Emir" last year after declaring loyalty to ISIS. Mindanao has 
long been the headquarters of extremist movements in the Philippines. However, 
now the conditions are more complicated as extremists from Malaysia, Indonesia, 
and other countries in the Middle East have gathered in Mindanao. This sparked 
fears that such a situation could lead Mindanao to become a regional bastion of 
ISIS. 
In the battle of Marawi, the Philippine military is overwhelmed and has 
difficulties facing extremists. They often make mistakes and unnecessary casualties 
occur in the Philippine military. The Philippine government and military were 
deeply tarnished when ISIS successfully defeated a Filipino mechanical infantry 
battalion. This is known from the circulation of a photograph where two armored 
personnel carriers (APC) were forced to be abandoned by Philippine troops on 
Saturday, May 27, 2017. The two APCs did not move after being tricked by 
Maute. They were cornered, immobilized, and lured to a landmine-filled spot. In 
fact, this strategy was not quite right because the use of an APC in urban warfare 
without escort from infantry caused these two APCs to be levy of Maute militias 
who attacked with anti-tank guns and heavy machine guns. This was not the first 
time there was an attack, during the initial phase of the APCs. This is because the 
Maute was able to seize armored vehicles belonging to the Philippine anti-terror 
police. 
Facing difficulties on the ground, the Philippine military began to use air 
strikes. But, apparently, various difficulties and mistakes were still often befalling 
them. For example, there was a mistake that occurred on Wednesday May 31, 
2017. The light military aircraft Marchetti S-211 accidentally fell  to friendly fire.24 
As a result, eight Philippine soldiers were wounded, and eleven soldiers were 
killed on the battlefield. After this incident, Manila decided to suspend the attack 
from the air temporarily. Indeed, the use of air strikes in the battle of the city was 
very risky. Then, on July 12, 2017, two new FA-50 fighter planes were on a 
mission to destroy the position of the Maute group in Marawi City when one of its 
bombs missed its target by 250 meters. The bomb blew up a nearby building and 
threw Filipino soldiers inside the shelter, killing two soldiers and wounding eleven 
others. The cause of the missed bomb is still being investigated by the Philippines. 
Possible reasons for the missed bomb were because of the complexity of the 
                                                         
24  Al-Jazeera, Philippines: 11 Soldiers Killed in Misdirected Air Raid, online: 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/philippines-10-soldiers-killed-friendly-fire-
170601031851380.html, (July 18, 2017). 
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battlefield, the fog disturbed the pilot's view, or it was the fault of the pilot', his 
fighter, or the bomb. 
If examined further, the story of the Philippine military's failure to carry out 
its mission is not just about fighting terrorists in Marawi alone. It also happened 
during the liberation of hostages abducted by the Abu Sayyaf in 2016. On April 9, 
2016, it was reported that 18 Filipino soldiers were killed, and 59 others were 
wounded in a battle. The surprise of the Abu Sayyaf stronghold reported only 
four militants were killed. The death toll suffered more from the Philippine army, 
as was accused by local officials; the Abu Sayyaf mobilized around 100 to 150 
militants quickly. These results were more painful because those who died were 
mostly members of the Special Forces. The Philippine Army Special Forces were 
incorporated in the 44th infantry battalion, 14th infantry troops, and especially the 
4th Special Forces battalion. Based on information from various sources, the 4th 
Special Forces battalion is known to be more active in counter-terrorism 
operations domestically, especially in the rebel areas of the Southern Philippines. 
Some of the tasks this troop carried out were anti-guerrilla operations serving the 
MILF and the MNLF, as well as the security operations of the Abu Sayyaf, 
Jamaah Islamiyah, and Al-Qaeda groups in Mindanao. 
The international public must continue to appreciate the efforts of the 
Philippines government and military in making the situation peaceful again, 
especailly regarding the number of the Philippines soldier who died in the 
battlefield. However, as a sovereign state with a defensive component, what 
happens in Marawi certainly sparks questions from various parties regarding the 
performance of the Philippine government, particularly the Philippnes military. 
For months, Maute has taken control of the Marawi and, to this day, the city has 
not been fully recaptured by the Philippine military. The question could be asked, 
how could thousands of troops from dozens of battalions deployed, including with 
fighter aircraft, still be unable to destroy the insurgent forces that number only 
400-500 people? At first, the Philippine military always refused help from foreign 
militaries. This is understandable because, of course, they want to maintain 
prestige and do not want to look weak from a regional and international view. 
Now, the United States Special Forces reportedly began to engage in operations 
against the Maute group.25 Nevertheless, the Philippine Military says that United 
States soldiers only provide technical assistance to end the siege in the Marawi 
town and not directly involved in the fighting.  
As a regional terrorist movement, the Maute militia groups certainly want to 
expand their presence beyond the Philippines. Especially with the never-ending 
armed conflict in Marawi, the possibility of crossing the militias out of the 
Philippines is quite open. This situtation certainly makes the neighboring countries 
also wary. For example, Indonesia continues to tighten patrol in the area of 
                                                         
25  British Broadcasting Corporation - BBC, Marawi Siege: US Special Forces Aiding Philippine 
Army,online:  http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-40231605, (July 18, 2017). 
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Sangihe Archipelago which is directly adjacent to the Philippines. It could be 
understood the Indonesia has become more alert because, of course, Indonesia 
does not want to be missed in preventing extremist infiltration. 26  From this 
exposure, it can be concluded that the Philippine military forces currently have 
not been able to achieve their ideal plan. So, to overcome separatists, extremists, 
and terrorists, the Philippine government needs to create alternative approaches, 
other than military. For example, these approaches can be done  through religion 
and culture. 
IV. MUSLIM SPECIAL UNIT: OPPORTUNITY AND CHALLENGE 
This section is the culmination of the analysis in this study, in which the Philippine 
government is attempting an alternative approach. This approach was 
implemented after conventional military action faced severe challenges. In April 
2017, the Philippine Military announced plans to form a special combat unit of 
Muslim soldiers with quotas designated for Muslims in the Philippines. In more 
detail, the Philippine Air Force has a 600 quota for enlisted personnel and 80 for 
military officers. The Philippine Navy has 1,660 registered personnel and 140 for 
officers. With this new recruitment system, it is expected that AFP can form a 
battalion of Muslim soldiers. In the long term, a brigade or division of Muslims 
will be formed. Then, there is the prospect of the existence of Muslim special unit 
within the Philippines military. In some ways, the emergence of this special 
Muslim unit has a positive impact.  
First, religious and cultural approaches can open up a larger dialogue space 
than in conventional military approaches. There are many factors, influencing the 
difficulty of the Philippine army extinguishing the conflict in the south. One of 
these factors is the less-welcomed cooperation by the MILF which has been 
granted special autonomy in two provinces. With the presence of a Muslim special 
unit, it is expected that the approach of the Philippine army to the MILF could be 
better because it would be done with a religious and cultural approach. As 
expressed by the Philippine government, the unit is expected to increase 
government efforts in the face of Islamic extremist rebel groups in the Philippines, 
particularly in the southerm region.27 The Muslim troops will be made up of the 
best units and can spread easily across the Muslim community as they can follow 
the culture and possess Islamic religious knowledge. As fellow Muslims, the army 
will be more aware of sensitive matters in their religion and culture. 
Second, the special Muslim unit can facilitate adaptation and gain local 
community support. With this new order, the five percent quota for all enlistments 
                                                         
26  Sriwani Adolong, “Melihat Aktivitas Perbatasan Indonesia-Filipina di Tengah Krisis Marawi: 
Lebih Waspada Kalau Ada Warga Asing Masuk”, Jawa Pos, (Sunday, June 4, 2017), p. 1. 
27  Agence France Presse, Philippine Army Plans All-Muslim Units, online: 
http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/philippine-army-plans-all-muslim-
units/article18061477.ece, (July 20, 2017). 
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in the Philippine Military will be allocated to Muslim applicants. The final goal of 
establishing this special unit is to establish a brigade or division dedicated to 
deployment to the troubled southern region of the Philippines. Later, the units will 
be placed in Muslim-majority areas. Since the approach to local communities is 
done by religious and cultural methods, through the presence of the brigades, the 
Philippine army is expected to operate in Muslim-majority areas without being 
viewed with suspicion by the local population.28 It is true that most Muslims in the 
southern Philippines see the deployment of nearly 100 percent of the army - 
especially non-Muslims - within their communities as invading or imperialist 
forces. Therefore, it takes a special unit of the Muslim army to convince local 
residents that the mission of the military is to bring security to all Filipinos and not 
to oppress the Muslims in the south. 
Third, the unit will facilitate better coordination and a more cooperative 
network between the militaries of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei Darussalam, as 
they are neighboring countries with a Muslim majority population. As discussed 
above, the southern region of Mindanao, which is home to the Muslim minority of 
the Philippines, has been plagued by insurgency and separatism since 1970. This 
caused the loss of more than 120,000 lives. Although the large insurgent 
organizations have agreed on a ceasefire with the government for years, small 
factions and fractions still refuse to compromise and some even declared loyalty to 
the ISIS terrorist group. As has also been widely discussed above, that small 
group who affiliated with ISIS often hijacks vessels and kidnapping its crew that 
cross the state border waters, so this problem becomes a regional issue. 
Therefore, coordination with the military of neighboring countries, such as 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei Darussalam, is absolutely necessary. The 
emergence of a special Muslim unit will at least reduce the partition between the 
Philippines and the other three Muslim-majority countries. Even in Malaysia and 
Brunei Darussalam, Islam is the official religion. So, the religious and cultural 
approach in both countries will be affected by the acceptance of both countries. 
This is  although the military of each country must be professional in upholding 
sovereignty and humanity. Thus, the emergence of a Muslim special unit in the 
Philippine military opens up new opportunities for conflict resolution. 
On the other hand, the emergence of a Muslim special unit in the Philippine 
military can also have negative impacts. First, there is the potential for factions 
within the military or a gap between Muslim units and other units. There have 
been many cases in various countries showing the breakdown of the military into 
competing and hostile factions. The most recent example was in July 2016 in 
Turkey; a military faction claimed to take over the administration of President 
Recep Tayip Erdogan. It was further reported that an F-16 Fighting Falcon fighter 
                                                         
28   Gracel Ortega, AFP Looking to Establish Battalion-Size Muslim Soldiers, Then Develop Into 
Brigade Division, online: https://www.update.ph/2017/04/afp-looking-to-establish-battalion-size-
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jet owned by Turkish military, who was an Erdogan loyalist, was shot down by a 
military helicopter used by factions who supported the coup. In this case, it is 
clear that the split from within the Turkish military occured and harmed the 
legitimate government. Another example is the outbreak of the Myanmar military 
into two factions. The split stems from the rivalry of two factions led by Khin 
Nyunt, based on military intelligence, against Maung Aye, with a background of 
combat and psychological warfare. Both continue to clash to expand their 
influence and power in Myanmar.29  Based on these examples of experience, if 
taken in the context of the Philippines Military, if not properly managed, not 
treated fairly, and not instilled in the proper spirit of nationalism, then the 
emergence of a special Muslim unit can be a new problem for the Philippines. 
Instead of easing the process of realizing peace in the Muslim-majority South, it 
could become a new "fuel" in fueling the already existing conflict. 
Secondly, a special unit can increase the stigma that Muslims are terrorists, so 
therefore must be fought with hardcore Muslims. Islam is often accused of being a 
religion or belief that is full of violence and hard ideology. Indeed, in Islam there 
is familiarity with the existence of Jihad, which means fighting in the way of Allah, 
but this meaning is often mistaken as an act that does not have the concept of 
human rights. In general, these misconceptions are manifested as the idea that 
fighting for religion is a duty and, to realize it, killing is considered valid and 
permissible. This assumption makes Islam often associated with the extremist and 
terrorist movement; whereas, in fact, it is actually an issue that is only deliberately 
linked to Islam. The issue is used to destroy the name of Islam by constructing the 
image of a radical and violent religion that does not value democracy and other 
freedoms. That understanding creates Islamaphobia. In the life of society, 
Islamaphobia is manifested by fear and hatred towards Islam and all Muslims. 
The fear and hatred also refer to the practice of discrimination against Muslims by 
marginalizing them from economic, social, political, and cultural life.30 As a result, 
the people of the world are not the least affected by the issue. These reasons are 
why the emergence of a Muslim special unit in the Philippine military, if not 
properly managed, may strengthen this Islamaphobic stigma. It may appear as if it 
is necessary to fight radical Muslims with other Muslims who are not less radical 
in military gear. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As a sovereign state with a defense component, the Philippine military forces 
currently are not in the ideal condition for maintaining security in the country. 
                                                         
29  Ita Mutiara Dewi, “Pengalaman Militer Burma: Sebuah Analisis Historis-Politis”, Istoria: Jurnal 
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Kusuma and Zaen Musyirifin, (Yogyakarta: Interfidei, 2016), p. 188. 
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This is evidenced by the difficulties and problems they face in terrorism cases. 
These terrorist cases include incidents such as ship hijacking with the abduction of 
its crew by the Abu Sayyaf group in the border waters and direct gunfire in 
Marawi city combat against Maute group who is affiliated with ISIS, or Daesh. 
The Philippine military has always refused aid from foreign military because they 
want to maintain prestige and do not want to look weak in the international 
worldview. Therefore, a breakthrough appeared needed to aid in the anticipation 
of the conditions of their military strength that are not ideal. This means that 
conventional military approaches were not enough, therefore there was a need for 
alternative approaches, such as religion and culture. Therefore, the Philippine 
military formed a Muslim special unit. 
The establishment of a Muslim special unit within the Philippine military has 
a good chance of being successful, but there are also big challenges. The 
opportunities for success include a larger dialogue space than in conventional 
military approaches due to a more religious and cultural approach. Also, the unit 
has the ability to facilitate adaptation and gain local community support. Third, 
there is the opportunity to facilitate the coordination and cooperation of a network 
with the Indonesian, Malaysian and Brunei Darussalam militaries, as they are 
neighboring countries with a majority Muslim population. This network would be 
especially useful in dealing with piracy actions against ships passing through the 
border waters. But, the emergence of these opportunities is followed by risky 
challenges. First, there is the potential for factions within the military or gap 
between Muslim units and other units. Second, the military unit can increase the 
stigma that Muslims are terrorists and must also be fought with hardcore Muslims.  
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